Surprising news -- Belief preservation -- Partisans and party identifiers -- When the public is not buying -- Personal knowledge and experience -- Political talk -- Trust and distrust -- Diffuse and subconscious effects -- Public service and commercial TV -- Hyper-pluralism in the digital age -- Pluralist news diets? -- Explaining media political effects.
Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Section 1 Urban Politics and Economic Policy -- 1 Does Politics Matter? -- 2 Transforming Needs into Expenditure Decisions -- 3 Party Influence on Local Spending in Denmark -- 4 Economics, Politics, and Policy in Norwegian Communes -- Section 2 Urban Systems and Public Services -- 5 The Urban System, Politics, and Policy in Belgian Cities -- 6 Central Places and Urban Services -- Section 3 Debts, Cuts, and Crises -- 7 Fiscal Strain and American Cities: Six Basic Processes -- 8 Fiscal Strain in American Cities: Some Limitations on Popular Explanations -- 9 Urban Management and Fiscal Stringency: United States and Britain -- 10 Cities, Capital, and Banks: The Politics of Debt in the U.S.A., U.K., and France -- About the Authors.
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Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
In: Veröffentlichungsreihe der Abteilung Demokratie: Strukturen, Leistungsprofil und Herausforderungen des Schwerpunkts Zivilgesellschaft, Konflikte und Demokratie 2008,201
In: Veröffentlichungsreihe der Forschungsgruppe "Zivilgesellschaft, Citizenship und Politische Mobilisierung in Europa", Forschungsschwerpunkt Zivilgesellschaft, Konflikte und Demokratie, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung : discussion paper 2005-402
In: Veröffentlichungsreihe des Forschungsschwerpunkts Sozialer Wandel, Institutionen und Vermittlungsprozesse des Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin für Sozialforschung 96-301
AbstractIn spite of the concern about the political influence of the new digital media, especially social media, a large amount of circumstantial evidence suggests that their impact on mass political attitudes and behaviour, which is the focus of this article, may be small. Online news is less widely trusted than the news consumed via the legacy media (TV, radio, newspapers and magazines) and social media are least trusted of all. Most people rely heavily on the mainstream legacy media for their news, which are also the most popular online news sources—especially the BBC and much the same news is accessed on the new and old media. The majority of people have a fairly mixed diet of politically neutral and partisan news and there is little evidence of political 'echo chambers'—even among the small minority that rely heavily on a single, partisan source. All age groups gather their news in similar ways, including the youngest, who make heavy use of the social media. Nevertheless, in the absence of rigorous research on causal effects on mass political attitudes and behaviour, we do not know whether the impact of the new media is strong or weak. The circumstantial evidence suggests they are likely to be weak.
AbstractIt is commonly said that the lockdowns and social distancing necessary to control coronavirus pandemics will only work if the general population trusts its government, believes the information it provides, and has confidence in its policies. This article traces the British government's record in providing information about its policies and performance, and compares this with the public's use of the mainstream news media. It then considers how these two sources of information affected trust in government and public compliance with social distancing and lockdown rules. Lastly, it compares Covid‐19 with Brexit and draws conclusions about how beliefs and behaviour are formed when individuals are personally faced with a serious threat.
It is commonly said that the lockdowns and social distancing necessary to control coronavirus pandemics will only work if the general population trusts its government, believes the information it provides, and has confidence in its policies. This article traces the British government's record in providing information about its policies and performance, and compares this with the public's use of the mainstream news media. It then considers how these two sources of information affected trust in government and public compliance with social distancing and lockdown rules. Lastly, it compares Covid‐19 with Brexit and draws conclusions about how beliefs and behaviour are formed when individuals are personally faced with a serious threat.
AbstractIt is commonly believed that the general public is heavily dependent on the media for its political news and views and that, as a consequence, the media exercise a strong influence over public opinion and behaviour. However, many millions in the Western world strongly believe things that are barely ever mentioned in the mainstream media, just as many millions also firmly reject or ignore some of the messages that are repeated incessantly by them. This confirms sixty years of experimental psychology research showing that most individuals are capable of preserving their beliefs, even in the face of overwhelming evidence, argument and logic to the contrary. Consistent with this, political science research finds little evidence of strong media influence on the party voting, political attitudes and election agendas of citizens. They have their own ways of gathering political information about the world around them, and they do not necessarily believe what they read in the papers, unless they are so inclined to start with. Consequently, media influences on mass opinion and behaviour are weaker than commonly assumed and, such as they are, their effects are more beneficial than harmful for democracy.